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Abstract
This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of pro-
fessional failure. You can read it, if you like. Or don’t.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
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1 Introduction
I experienced great disappointment as I tried and failed, from 2015-2019, to secure a
position working inside of professional philosophy. I spent a great deal of time reflecting
on the experience: one of the research interests I had cultivated in philosophy was (properly
Husserlian, transcendental) phenomenology. Living through failure was distressing, but I
still found it stimulating to try to understand the intentional structure of my experiences.
Old habits die hard.
What follows is a phenomenological analysis of experiences of professional failure.
It may be of interest to anyone interested in phenomenology. It may be of interest to
anyone with a specific interest in this kind of experience–perhaps if they are undergoing it
themselves, or seeing an Other go through it, or even telling a story in which a character
goes through something like it. It may, in fact, be of very little interest, and I won’t
say anything further in an attempt to persuade you to read it. One of the few perks of
professional failure is that once one has come out on the other side of it, one is spared the
labor of justifying oneself to the profession. I’m not contributing to any ongoing discussion
here. I make no attempt to situate myself in much literature besides phenomenology, and
even then, I won’t employ completely hygienic citation practices. I also won’t always speak
in an overly professional tone – which feels nice.
The essay is not intended as a piece of “quit-lit.” In the first place, I didn’t quit, so
this is a misnomer. But further, to the extent I understand the unspoken rules that seem
to be at work in the nascent quit-lit genre, here are some of the ways I break them.
(1) My own autobiographical details are largely irrelevant, and generally omitted. At
best, they could serve as token illustrations; but my goal, as in any phenomenological
investigation, is to understand the essential structure of a type of conscious experience.
(2) While I do have some lingering “theoretical” interest in whether the phenomeno-
logical analyses I offer are apt, I am – genuinely – not seeking any personal validation.
Suggestions for how to improve my analyses are vaguely welcome; less welcome are heartfelt
expressions of encouragement or solidarity (particularly from people I have not encoun-
tered face-to-face). Completely irrelevant would be any rejoinders that misunderstand me
as in any way bemoaning my experiences. The theme here is not “woe is me,” but rather
“how does this work?”
(3) Thinking through these issues was cathartic, but the bulk of this essay is not
intended as catharsis. Writing the essay was work, and it is intended as a work of quasi-
scholarship: I hope to accomplish a bit of the kind of intellectual work that a philosopher
(of a certain stripe) would do. Old habits die hard.
(4) I’m not trying to persuade anyone (including myself) that it’s a good idea to quit
any profession, or that it’s a blessing in disguise to fail in any profession. I myself disliked
it, and would not recommend it to a friend. This negative evaluation forms part of the
phenomena I will examine below, but did not motivate my examination.
(5) I do not intend to moralize about the “plight” of any profession, or to offer any
scathing critique of socio-economic-bureaucratic forces that might be at work in “corrupt-
ing” any profession. Such particularities about specific professions are largely irrelevant.
Let’s get on with it.
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2 “Professional Failure?”
“Fail” is said in many ways. One can be called a failure by someone for not meeting their
expectations, even if these are not one’s own expectations. Here I am focused on cases
where one thinks of oneself as a failure, by one’s own lights.
By one’s own lights, one can fail in even the simplest of tasks. If I reach to grab a
glass of water and accidentally knock it over, I might regard myself as failing. This sort
of one-off failure is relatively harmless in the long run. I might take a moment to berate
myself for getting it wrong, but I can mop up the water, pour a new glass, and get on
with things without too much interruption or distress. If the consequences of a one-off
failure are severe enough, then it may cause more significant distress. But in this essay I
am focused on failures that are a bit more involved than isolated, one-off failures. It may
help to sketch out a rough picture of professionalization.
Professionalization is the process whereby one can be inducted into a profession as a
full-fledged member in good standing. Being counted as a member – being recognized a
“professional” oneself – requires gaining specialized knowledge and specialized skills, and
for this reason, it is usually a prolonged process, and often proceeds through phases. Some
basic skills and knowledge can be acquired in early training (e.g., a B.A.). More advanced
training is required to fine-tune these skills and develop expertise, often through a kind of
prolonged apprenticeship (e.g., M.A., Ph.D.). All this training is required to put one in a
position to attempt to demonstrate their competence as a peer to, and of roughly equal
standing with, existing members of the profession.
Initiates often begin the process of professionalization based on some pre-existing
interests, presuming that these interests would be fulfilled by the work-activities of the
profession. One wants to be a member because (one thinks) one wants to do that work. But
make no mistake: the process of professionalization is built to whip nascent interest into the
shape of responsible work -activity that meets the standards of the profession. One role of
mentors is to provide clear assessment of how well one is faring in meeting those standards.
Through the process, one is conforming to externally-imposed standards, reforming oneself
(and usually, institutionalizing oneself, in a sense). Because of the investment of time and
labor involved, and because of the intimate and self-critical character of conformation,
one generally can’t sustain engagement through the phases of professionalization unless
one is committed to it. Luck helps. It can also be useful and encouraging to interact
with associates who are going through a similar process and facing similar challenges. But
most importantly, one has to be able to see each challenge as a worthwhile step towards
the end-goal of membership in the profession. Success at each step is thus thematically
linked to the larger success of becoming a member of the profession. This is generally
bound up with one’s self-conception or identity: (one thinks that) one wants to be one of
those people, be a member of that profession, and as one is working towards that goal,
one understands oneself as on-the-way-to-being, or becoming, the person who (one thinks)
one wants to be.
For reasons like these, (what I am calling) professional failure is not quite so easily
overcome as spilling some water, and is a bit more complex than any isolated, one-off
failure. A failure on the path of professionalization threatens to un-do and invalidate a
great deal of prior work, it challenges one’s own identity, and it complicates relationships
with peers and mentors. As I intend to use the term, experiences of professional failure
occur with the features and in the contexts summarized below:
1. In making the attempt, one sees oneself as committed to a plan, the goal of which
is membership in some in-group (the profession).
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2. One sees membership in the in-group as an aspect of identity that one would like
to have.
3. One currently sees oneself as someone-who-is-on-the-way-to-being, or becoming,
a member, in virtue of working through the plan; one tentatively feels at-home
alongside Others in the in-group.
4. One sees oneself as failing in the attempt.
5. The failure is seen as preventing advancement of the plan.
6. Since previous steps in the plan were supposedly preparation for this attempt, the
failure calls into question whether and how well one has succeeded in previous steps.
7. Since success in the plan consists of attaining an identity as a member, the failure
calls into question whether one can attain that identity.
8. Since failure in the attempt interrupts progress in the plan, it calls into question
one’s current identity as someone-who-is-on-the-way-to-being, or becoming, a mem-
ber, and thus calls into question relationships with Others.
The distinctive experiences of failure that I want to discuss here are ones that exhibit
all these features. We haven’t done any phenomenology yet by simply sketching out
the target class of experiences using 1-8. The aim of the forthcoming phenomenological
analysis is to more precisely analyze the essential intentional structure of experiences like
these. At first pass, the aim is to understand more fully what is involved in all the talk of
“seeing-as” and “calling into question” in 1-8 above.
Conditions 1-8 are not quite sufficient to clarify my aims here. Conditions 1-8 are
satisfied, to an extent, in any single case of an experience of professional failure. What I
am especially interested in examining are cases where an array of multiple experiences of
failure occur, all meeting conditions 1-8, repeatedly calling into question one’s profession-
alization. I’m interested in cases where repeated professional failure leads to an experience
of abjection, and in how this influences one’s experienced identity and experienced social
standing.
Some caveats and additional clarifications of scope.
(1) I don’t especially care whether cases meeting my conditions are especially common
or especially rare: the analysis I’ll offer is simply intended to fit such cases where they
occur.
(2) I don’t especially care whether a commonsense or intuitive conception of “profes-
sion” is required to get an experience that fits these conditions. Perhaps trying to become
friends with a group of people and to join in their social activities will count as a trying
to join a “profession” by these criteria: so be it; then my analyses should fit such cases.
(3) Perhaps there are cases one might want to call “experiences of professional failure”
where some of these features (especially those regarding self-conceptions of identity) are
lacking: that’s fine, but I’m not interested in them here.
(4) Perhaps under the right circumstances, some people experience knocking over a
glass of water as the kind of failure I’ve described here. I think that would be unfortunate,
but if so, my analyses should fit their case.
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3 “Phenomenology?”
I won’t provide a thorough introduction to Husserlian phenomenology,1 but there are
some aspects of the Husserlian approach I’ll presuppose, and a few concepts I’ll deploy
centrally. I’ll introduce each of them as briefly as I can in this section. I’m not really
“doing” phenomenology yet in this section, I’m just clarifying what it is I’ll do when I do
it later.
3.1 Epoche & Intentionality
The fundamental presupposition of Husserlian phenomenology (though it is not a mere
presupposition) is that the epoche is the correct route to understanding intentionality.2
The epoche (“bracketing”) is a change of perspective through which one ceases to
presume the mind-independent actuality of the entire world and everything in it. We
normally presume the actuality of the world as a matter of course – this is “the Natural
Attitude.” The epoche suspends and interrupts the Natural Attitude. The epoche can
be thought of as a modulation of radical skepticism (“Cartesian doubt”). Unlike the
skeptic, we don’t especially care to work out what can be known with certainty, nor is
our main aim to locate some foundational certainties from which to derive other pieces
of knowledge, systematically recovering some of our convictions about the world. We
don’t aim to challenge or undermine our na¨ıve certainty about the existence of the world
at all, really. Rather, the idea is that we set aside or “put out of play” all questions
(and answers) about whether any object of conscious experience exists. We treat all such
objects of experience as phenomena – merely apparent or merely purported objects.
The idea is that when we take up this perspective, we are able to examine conscious
experience on its own terms: that is our objective. In particular, the intentional structure
of conscious experience remains intact. For example, suppose I see a black coffee mug.
I’m convinced it’s there. I set that conviction aside, and regard my perception simply
as an experience as-of a black coffee mug. The perception remains a perception as-of a
material object, even after I bracket any assumptions about the object’s existence. This
kind of directedness towards a purported object is called “intentionality,” and it is not
at all modified by the epoche. The epoche reveals that intentionality is built into the
structure of experience itself. The structure of an experience as-of a real-world coffee
mug has got nothing inherently to do with real-world, mind-independent coffee mugs. By
contrast, all our beliefs about real-world, mind-independent objects have got everything
to do with the structure of the experiences that purport to present us with such objects.
3.2 Pure Ego & Essence
Things get a little weird when we recognize that, normally, we are constantly presupposing
the reality of ourselves as an embodied human agent in the social world. These are some
of the presumptions regarding existence that are to be bracketed in the epoche.
Virtually the entirety of post-Husserlian “phenomenology” declares that this isn’t
possible. In particular, it’s often claimed that we can’t bracket the existence of our bodies
1Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen are not here regarded as proper phenomenology.
I’ve drank the transcendental kool-aid, and from this perspective (i.e., Husserl’s) anyone
reaching back to LU for a solid grip on phenomenology has largely missed the point.
2See Ideen I and Die Krisis.
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(embodiment is just too essential for our consciousness), or that we can’t bracket the
existence of other agents alongside us in the social world (mundane intersubjectivity is
just too essential for our consciousness). I neither have nor need an argument to convince
anyone otherwise: this isn’t the place for an argument. Some of us claim to be able to do
this thing, the epoche, and to be able to bracket our own existence as embodied humans
in the social world. No formal argument could convince anyone who says they can’t that
they can. What is at issue is simply a free act. Do it if you like, or don’t. If you do it,
you’ll see that you can. Maybe you find it difficult to do, and say that you can’t – I’ll
even believe, if you like, that you can’t. But please, grant me the same courtesy. Don’t
offer me an argument to try to convince me that I can’t. I do, on occasion.3
When we do bracket our existence as a human, as I said, things get a little weird. We
can ask: “who is performing the epoche?” We can’t answer “me, a human subject,” since
if we’ve done the thing, we’ve bracketed ourselves as human subjects, and could at best
speak only of “the phenomenon of me as a human subject.” The question was precisely:
“who has carried out the act of changing their perspective, such that they can no longer
assume themselves to exist as a human subject?”
“The pure ego” is the phenomenological term used to refer to the conscious subject
who performs the epoche, and who is thus capable of understanding themselves as having
a dimension of subjectivity beyond empirical, human subjectivity. This remainder of sub-
jectivity, revealed through the epoche, is called “transcendental subjectivity.” The central
purpose of transcendental phenomenology is to investigate it, with particular attention
to how intentionality is structured and how it arises such that consciousness purports to
present us with objects of consciousness.
Since we bracket the reality of ourselves as empirically real human agents, we don’t
understand any of our conscious experiences as empirically real psychological events (let
alone, gods forbid, neural events) that occur in the objective time of the world. We’ve
bracketed all the assumptions of existence that would be required to understand expe-
riences in that way. We’re only interested in experiences as aspects of the intentional
structure of transcendental subjectivity. And in pure phenomenology, we’re not inter-
ested in studying them one at a time as isolated factoids, looking for their idiosyncratic
features. Rather, we aim to understand them “in their essence,” meaning, we want to
understand the necessary features of broad types of experience. We might investigate, for
example, what all experiences of perception necessarily have in common: what features of
intentionality are essential to the class of perceptions, as such.
Here I’m interested in experiences of professional failure as delineated in S2 above, and
I want to do a transcendental phenomenology of them. I’m going to perform the epoche,
bracket all assumptions of worldly existence, and attempt to uncover essential features of
the intentional structure of all such experiences. If that doesn’t sound like fun, feel free
to get off the boat.
3Similar sentiments are expressed in earlier varieties of transcendental, German ide-
alism. Fichte’s Science of Knowledge: “No one can be compelled to do this... this con-
sciousness cannot be demonstrated to anyone; each person must freely create it in himself”
(Fichte I, 429/11); “...we have a few other concepts besides theirs... of which they cannot
judge, since it simply does not exist for them. Let them go about their business, and leave
us to pursue our own” (Fichte I, 498/68). From Schelling’s System of Transcendental Ide-
alism: transcendental “Self-consciousness... is an exercise of absolute freedom, to which
one can certainly be directed, but not compelled” (Schelling 365/24).
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3.3 The Phenomena of Me, as Human Subject
It’s important to emphasize again that the epoche is not a mode of skeptical doubt.
When I bracket my existence as a human subject, I’m not seriously doubting that I am
in fact a human subject, I’m just setting the question of my worldly existence aside. All
the phenomena of me as a human remain. (A similar thing goes for every object of
consciousness: no phenomenon is lost in the epoche, presumptions of existence are simply
set aside.) Indeed, part of the project of transcendental phenomenology is to try to clarify
how I appear to myself as a human subject: how it is that transcendental subjectivity
“constitutes” the phenomenon of me as a human subject. Here’s the short version, in
three steps.4
First: transcendental subjectivity has its own temporality. Even after we bracket
the existence of the world and its history, transcendental subjectivity has its own history.
Consciousness is never a punctate or pointilistic awareness of a single moment, but involves
a consciousness of an immediate past and an immediate future. Built into the intentional
structure of every experience is some degree of directedness toward the past, and some
directedness toward the future.5 As this brief “window” of consciousness (what Husserl
calls “the living present”) is repeatedly filled with content, the directedness at each moment
toward past and future stitches experiences together into a continuous subjective time.
Every experience we have takes its place within this subjective time.
Second: It is the pure ego who ultimately endorses any thesis about the way things are,
in an act of judgment. For example, perception purports to present us with the way the
world is: a presumptive thesis of existence is built into the intentionality of perception.
The pure ego can go along with this thesis, forming the belief that the world is as it
appears; or the pure ego can resist this thesis, believing that the world is otherwise. I’ll
say a bit more about this in SS3.4&3.5 below. (And of course, there is a third option: the
pure ego can “bracket” the thesis completely and simply apprehend the phenomenon that
the perception purports to present, without judging one way or the other.)
Third (the key step, and a big one): Some of the acts of judgment that the pure
ego carries out constitute the phenomena of my human subjectivity. I can reflect on
my past experiences in subjective time, and can come to a judgment that I am a stable
human subject. Judgments about the stability of my material body (Korper) are relatively
straightforward cases of the kinds of perceptual judgments I’ve just discussed. Things are
tricker when it comes to understanding judgments about the stability of my personal
character. Here’s a sketch of how this works.
My experiences now include a directedness toward experiences in my subjective past.
I can divert my attention to those past experiences. Some of my past experiences present
me as a subject who had certain motives at a particular moment in subjective time.
These motives contained theses6 about what was valuable, what should be done, what
should be thought – most generally, theses about what should come next. At the time,
I endorsed some of these theses. Reflecting on these past motives, I could now go along
with their theses again: for example, I might re-affirm a motive, sustaining a conviction
4See Ideen II.
5Strictly speaking, this intentional directedness toward past and future is not just there,
but is built into experience through passive syntheses. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology
of association clarifies this.
6Strictly speaking, in the broadest sense of the terms, all theses are to be understood
phenomenologically as motives: all theses provide some motivation for the ego to imple-
ment them actively by endorsing them in judgment.
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in it. If I reflect on this re-affirming judgment, I can judge further that my convictions
are long-lasting: they have a duration that spans large portions of subjective time. Long-
lasting convictions in subjective time are the key phenomena that, na¨ıvely, we take to
be appearances of ourselves as a human subject with a stable personal character who is
(purportedly) engaged with a world.
Alternatively, I can resist re-affirmation of an old motive, letting it die. If I reflect on
this withholding of re-affirmation, I can judge further that I do not have a stable conviction
that lasts over a long duration of subjective time. A lack of long-lasting convictions cannot
na¨ıvely be taken as an appearance of a human subject with a stable personal character;
rather, they are taken as the appearance of ourselves as a human subject whose motives
are fluid and whose personal character has changed.
It is through these iterated reflective judgments that the phenomena of convictions are
or are not constituted, and these convictions (or lack thereof) – plus some niceties regarding
how all this is related to experiences of my lived Body (Leib) and of Others – are the
phenomena which purport to present me as an empirically real human subject in the world.
Na¨ıvely (before the epoche), we go along with theses that we have a personal character,
judging (without much deliberation) that we are such a human subject, whose convictions
are empirical psychological phenomena occurring in the objective time of the world. Once
we endorse the thesis that this human subject exists, we characteristically overlook the
pure ego’s role as an active subject: all the things we do as a subject are understood,
without further ado, as acts of an empirically real human subject. In the epoche, we
don’t go along with the thesis that we are empirically real humans, and we regain an
understanding of the pure ego; but the phenomena of ourselves as human subjects remain
as phenomena after the epoche. Indeed, the epoche lets us see how those phenomena arise
in transcendental subjectivity.
In the foregoing I’ve superficially referred to an individual ego making isolated deci-
sions on the basis of individual experiences, and constituting its own experience of itself
as-of a human subject. But the point was that this is how things work in essence. In
essence, anyone’s experiences of themselves as-of a human subject arise through iterated
reflective judgments that constitute (or fail to constitute) long-lasting convictions. Husserl
calls all this the “sedimentation” or “precipitation” (Niederschla¨g) of convictions, which
are the appearances as-of a personal ego.
3.4 Modality and Modalization
In the foregoing sub-section, I’ve discussed “theses” that are built into the intentional
structure of experiences. Let me say a bit more about them, and about how they interact.
Many theses arise in transcendental subjectivity as a matter of course, without the
pure ego’s active involvement. We’re not talking about someone sitting down and thinking
hard to creatively cook up a hypothesis or conjecture. For example: we don’t need to do
anything to make perception purport to present us with the world. Instead what it is to
have a perception is (essentially) to have an experience whose intentionality has already
been constituted to contain a belief-like thesis of worldly existence. (This is partly why
perception seems, na¨ıvely, to be something we passively undergo, and why it seems as if
the world simply reveals itself to us as soon as we care to take a glance or give a listen.)
But not all theses of existence are equal. There are many “modalities” or “modes” a
thesis can have. For present purposes, it will do to distinguish: (a) theses that occur in
a mode of certainty, (b) theses that occur in some mode of probability (whether high or
low), and (c) theses that occur in a mode of doubt.
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Husserl rarely discusses concrete cases as illustrations, but in the passage I’ll repro-
duce in a moment, he will eventually offer one. Here he is discussing the intentional
structure that supports the na¨ıve certainty that is characteristic of our perception of ma-
terial things. The idea is that any momentary experience as-of a thing has built-into it
two coordinated sets of expectations: (1) “kinesthetic” expectations of how I would have
experiences as-of my Body were I to move in relation to the thing and explore it, and (2)
perceptual expectations of how the thing-phenomenon would appear as I explored it. If
these expectations come to pass “harmoniously,” then theses regarding the existence of
the thing, in the na¨ıve mode of certainty, can persist un-modified. If, however, experiences
don’t unfold harmoniously and expectations are flouted, then earlier experiences must be
modalized or “corrected” in some way – old experiences cannot continue to be experiences
as-of the world as it is, if new experiences are as-of the world being otherwise. If expe-
riences cannot be synthesized harmoniously, one of them must have its presumption of
“validity” modified or called into question. Here’s Husserl:
Another extraordinarily important thematic direction has not yet been
named; it is characterized by the phenomenon of the alteration of validity—
for example, the alteration of being into illusion [z.b. des Wandels von Sein
in Schein]. In continuous perception a thing is there for me in the straightfor-
ward ontic certainty [Seinsgewißheit ] of immediate presence—though I must
add: normally, for only when, giving my kinesthesis free play, I experience
concurrent exhibitings as belonging to it is the consciousness sustained of the
one thing in actual presence, exhibiting itself in manifold fashion as itself.
But if I ask what is implied in the fact that the thing-exhibitings belong to
the altering kinesthesis, I recognize that a hidden intentional “if-then” rela-
tion is at work here: the exhibitings must occur in a certain systematic order;
it is in this way that they are indicated in advance, in expectation, in the
course of a harmonious perception. The actual kinestheses here lie within
the system of kinesthetic capacity, which is correlated with the system of
possible following events harmoniously belonging to it. This is, then, the in-
tentional background of every straightforward ontic certainty of a presented
thing.
Often, however, a breach in this harmony occurs: being is trans-
formed into illusion or simply into being-doubtful [Zweifelhaftsein], being-
merely-possible [Mo¨glicherweisensein], being-probable [Wahrscheinlichsein],
being-after-all-not-completely-illusory [Ja-doch-nicht-nichtiger-Schein-sein],
etc. The illusion is undone through “correction,” through changing the sense
in which the thing had been perceived. It is easy to see that the change of
apperceptive sense takes place through a change of the expectation-horizon
of the multiplicities anticipated as normal (i.e., as running on harmoniously).
For example, one saw a man, but then, upon touching him, had to reinterpret
him as a mannequin (exhibiting itself visually as a man).
Die Krisis, pp.164-165 in HUA VI,
pp.161-162 in Carr’s translation (amended)
Hopefully this gives the basic flavor of the “modes” that theses can have, and how these
can be altered in “modalization” (e.g., correction).
What may not be entirely clear from this passage is that such modalization often
occurs in transcendental subjectivity without the pure ego’s active involvement. We often
don’t need to do anything ourselves to make such a “correction” and for such modalizations
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to occur. Typically, we go about the world blissfully unaware of the work that has been
done in transcendental subjectivity to constitute the appearance of a stable world.
To try to illustrate this, let’s consider a radical case. Take a moment – this will start as
soon as you click and will only last about 15 seconds, so be ready – and look at this piece
of art by Patrick Hughes. The first time I experienced something like this, I found that I
had very little understanding of what I was seeing. I initially had one set of experiences
as-of the world that contained certain expectations – expectations that future experience
would unfold and the world would appear thus-and-so. This was followed by another
set of experiences as-of the world, and these experiences proceeded otherwise than I had
expected. All these experiences as-of the world could not simultaneously maintain their
na¨ıve thesis of ontic validity (the world could not be both thus-and-so and otherwise).
Without any involvement on my part, all these experiences had lost any presumption to
full validity, and had turned into perception in the mode of doubt. I remember feeling
distinctly uncomfortable as I tried to work out what I had seen and what had happened.
It was only after the experiences that I could make my own judgments about the matter
and egoically endorse any theses about the way the world was; in the initial experience, I
was simply confronted with the shock of modalization that had already occurred.
This is a nice segue to the next and final bit of phenomenology that I’ll review,
but before turning to that, let me emphasize: ontic validities, regarding the existence of
mundane material objects, are only a special case. A great many other varieties of validity
will become central in SS4&5 below. For now, it is sufficient to introduce the idea of socio-
cultural or “spiritual” (geistig) validities. It’s one thing for transcendental subjectivity to
constitute experiences as-of physical objects; its another for those purported objects to
be experienced as having a cultural or interpersonal significance. The short version here
is that cultural objects are experienced as having motivating power for human subjects:
they are experienced as soliciting or licensing human actions.
3.5 Act-schism
When the na¨ıve presumption of an experience’s validity is put into question without any
egoic involvement, this is what Husserl calls “passive doubt.”7 Often, minor cases of pas-
sive doubt can also be resolved (through modalization) without any active involvement
from the ego. Usually, transcendental subjectivity is working to maintain appearances
as-of a stable world, and often, it succeeds. Husserl calls this “passive decision-making”
– without the ego’s active involvement, options for how to interpret and synthesize ex-
periences as-of the world may be available, and options may be quietly discarded in a
“decision” that preserves a stable experience as-of a stable world.
But this is not always so – the “radical case” I just offered as illustration is one in
which we might actually become aware of lingering doubt that has arisen in perception,
but has not yet been fully-resolved. If we want to resolve it, we are put into active doubt:
the pure ego itself gets involved as we try to work out what is going on. In such cases,
transcendental subjectivity has not been able to quietly discard some option, and we are
left with two (or more) conflicting theses, both of which retain some claim to validity.
As the pure ego initially steps into these experiences to try make its own decision, it is
initially acting receptively: it tries going along with the theses that experience has offered
up. The ego cannot simultaneously go along with both theses; in active doubt, the pure
7See Analyses Concerning Passive & Active Syntheses.
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ego is pulled in two different directions. In considering the conflicting theses, the ego is
engaged in:
a mode of comportment [Verhalten] that displaces the ego into an act-schism
[das Ich in Aktspaltung versetzendes]. This essentially and immediately im-
plies an uneasiness [Unbehagen] and an original drive [einen urspru¨nglichen
Trieb] to get beyond it, to come back to the normal condition of unanim-
ity [der normalen Zustand der Einigkeit ]. There arises a striving [Streben]
toward a firm decision, one that is ultimately uninhibited and pure. It fre-
quently happens that the established concordance, and through this the inner
unity of the ego with itself that is aimed at, can be lost once again (PAS
2.S15.100).8
In order to resolve active doubt and to escape this act-schism, an egoic act of decision-
making is required, and this is an act of “striking down validity” or “setting-aside-validity”
(“Außer-Geltung-Setzen”) (PAS 2.S14.96).9 Since the presumptive validity of the theses
has not been resolved passively through modalization, the ego must engage in an act that
puts some thesis out of action despite the fact that the thesis does, for itself, continue to
make a claim about the way the world is.10 While active decision-making can return us to
a kind of harmonious experience of the world, it does not fully restore the na¨ıve certainty
that is characteristic of perception. It is instead a form of “impure certainty” (unreiner
Gewißheit) since it is secured only through the act of setting-aside-validities that (were
they reconsidered) would pose a challenge to the thesis we have endorsed through active
decision-making.
3.6 Sum: The Plan
I’m ready to do a phenomenology of experiences of professional failure (S2). While I’m of
course referring to experiences that I, as a human subject, actually had, I’ll be performing
the epoche (S3.1) to try to examine the essential intentional structures of these experiences
(S3.2): if it ever looks like I’m referring to objects in the world, I mean to be referring
to phenomena. To provide this phenomenological analysis I’ll make use of the concepts
of modalization (S3.4) and act-schism (S3.5). One of my main aims is to clarify how
experiences of professional failure alter the constitution of the phenomena of oneself as a
human subject (S3.3), changing how one appears to oneself.
4 A Phenomenology of Professionalization
Let’s begin with some basic clarifications of the backdrop to an experience of professional
failure: a brief phenomenology of professionalization itself.
8Compare Experience and Judgment SS21b, 71, 76, and esp. 78 on “act-cleavage.”
9Compare Experience and Judgment S71.
10This, I think, is why optical puzzles like my “radical” illustration above continue to
hold an allure: although we’ve come to a judgment about what’s really going on, we still
find the conflicting experiences to be themselves somewhat compelling in purporting to
present us with the world.
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4.1 Theses
What is it to be committed to a plan for achieving professional success? In large part,
it consists in having long-lasting convictions that have been sedimented as personal char-
acter traits through repeated re-endorsement. The theses in question are numerous and
interlocking.
There are theses concerning the value of the nascent interest-motives that one hopes
to pursue and fulfill in the profession. There are two broad classes of theses to distinguish
here. On the one hand, there are (a) affective theses that present the fulfillment of
interest-motives as pleasurable. Some of these theses are expectations: one anticipates
that fulfilling one’s interests will be pleasant. Yet there have also been past fulfillments of
interest-motives: cases where the affective thesis concerned an experience that was fully
present, and which was presented as pleasurable. All these (a)-theses purport to present
the fulfillment of one’s interest-motives as having an affective validity.
On the other hand, there are also (b) more conceptual-evaluative theses that present
the fulfillment of our interests to as “rewarding” or “worthwhile.” An experience as-of
a good sneeze could be the target of an (a)-thesis, a na¨ıve claim to affective validity: a
good sneeze can seem pleasant. But an experience as-of a good sneeze will likely not
be the target of a (b)-thesis: upon reflection, one would likely not evaluate experiences
as-of sneezing as especially worthwhile.11 When one affirms (b)-theses, one is assigning
an additional value, beyond the simple pleasure (affective validity) that is constituted in
(a)-theses. Repeated re-affirmation of worthwhileness provides the motivation to cultivate
the interests by investing effort to fulfill them.
There are (c) theses concerning the pragmatic value of securing membership in the
profession as a way of cultivating one’s interests. These theses present the process of pro-
fessionalization as having practical validity (utility), as a way of realizing the fulfillment of
one’s interests. When one initially develops and sustains investment in the plan to join the
profession, one is re-affirming the thesis that this path will fulfill one’s interests. (a)-theses
provide a nascent motivation to pursue one’s interests; (b)-theses provide an additional
motivation; (c)-theses constitute professionalization as a valid method of fulfilling all these
motivations.
There are (d) theses concerning the ontological or existential value of being a subject
who sustains commitment to the plan, and of eventually becoming a subject who has com-
pleted the plan and gained membership in the profession. These theses present this mode
of being (being-professional) as a valuable way to be. This goes beyond the mere practical
utility of professionalization as a means to an end: (d)-theses constitute professionalization
as an end in itself.
There are a variety of theses concerning one’s social-professional standing in relation to
Others. I won’t go into great detail concerning how peers and professionals are constituted
as a unique class of consociates in the social world; suffice it to say that they are.12 Broadly
speaking, there are three classes of theses concerning Others to distinguish here: (e) theses
that present oneself as already “belonging” alongside Others – i.e., that present Others
11I am indebted here to one of David Mitchell’s penetrating phenomenological analyses.
12See Schutz’ Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (or its very shoddy translation
The Phenomenology of the Social World) for a general phenomenology of sociality.
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as peers;13 (f ) theses that present oneself as on-the-way-to-belonging alongside Others
– i.e., that present Others as occupying a position one has not yet attained, but can
attain through professionalization; and (g) theses that present oneself as further-along
than Others – i.e., that present Others as occupying a position that one has surpassed
through professionalization. The specific “Others” toward whom these theses are directed
are expected to change as one proceeds in the process of professionalization – that is the
essential determinant of successful professionalization.
In what follows, I’ll be constantly referring to all these different varieties of theses.
Where it’s handy, I’ll throw brief reminders into the margins. (Sadly, these won’t display
nicely in hardcopy.)
4.2 Achievement, Repetition, & Integration
The core success-condition on the process of professionalization is to attain evidence that
will invalidate all (f )-theses, such that the (e)-theses now concern all other members of
the profession (i.e., all other professionals appear as peers; one has attained membership
alongside them), and the (g)-theses now concern all initiates who have not attained mem-
bership (i.e., one no longer views any mere initiate as a full peer in the profession; one
has surpassed them by attaining membership). Maintaining reasons to re-affirm past (e)-
theses and (g)-theses, and finding and creating reasons to implement ever-new (e)-theses
and (g)-theses, are the most central ways in which the experience of progress in profes-
sionalization is constituted. Long-lasting convictions in (e)- and (g)-theses, implemented
by the pure ego, are the most central experiences that would constitute one’s experience
as-of oneself as a human subject that has attained professional status.
The evidence that is required to invalidate (f )-theses and support (e)- and (g)-theses
lies in “achievement.” The term has a double meaning here. On the one hand, there are
those objects (in the broadest sense of the term) whose creation/acquisition is counted
as an achievement: the experience as-of these objects’ existence is the experience as-of
the existence of a completed achievement. On the other hand, there are experiences of
achievement-as-fulfillment, where achievement is more an aspect of the experiencing itself,
than of the purported object. These can come apart, and must be distinguished.
Achievement-Objects. Which objects are counted as achievements is characteris-
tic of, or peculiar to, a given profession. The essential feature of an achievement-object
is that its proper creation/acquisition is taken to depend upon the exercise of skills or
cultivation of traits that are valued in members of the profession, by members of the pro-
fession: the skills and traits in question are considered essential for someone deserving full
membership of the profession. As a result, the creation/acquisition of an achievement-
object is something that members of the profession have licensed is interpretable as (and
indeed, have mandated is to-be-interpreted-as) demonstrating possession of the skills and
traits that members possess. In this way, achievement-objects become tightly bound up
with the work-activity of the profession, and with the peculiar forms of human subjec-
tivity that count as professional “status.” This socio-cultural (geistig) meaning that is
attached to achievement-objects is their essential feature: they may take virtually any
material form, though there are contingent aspects of “tradition” in professions that tend
13There are some subtleties here. One can be peers with someone but still think that they
are more/less talented than oneself, better/worse at the work-activities of the profession,
etc. Peerhood is a threshold, and many additional evaluations can be made beyond it.
They don’t matter here.
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to privilege certain familiar achievement-objects above others.14 There are widespread
practices, in virtually all professions, of meticulously documenting the creation/acquisition
of achievement-objects (e.g., on a C.V. or Re´sume´) as a way of indicating one’s profes-
sional status to Others. However, many achievement-objects are created/acquired “off
the record,” so to speak, or may not be regarded as suitable for inclusion in a standard-
ized public record like a C.V. For example, one’s spoken contributions during professional
meetings – even quasi-casual conversation – can often count as achievement-objects. A
great deal of professional “networking” consists in creating/acquiring highly idiosyncratic
and localized achievement-objects (“scoring brownie points”) in full view of members of
the profession. It is not uncommon for more specialized achievement-objects to be recog-
nized only within the local context of a small enclave of the profession (e.g., sub-fields or
departments).
Achievement-as-fulfillment. The experience of achievement-as-fulfillment is a
more subject-relative matter; it consists in the experience of an active fulfillment of one’s
own prior goals, despite some variety of challenge. Phenomenologically, what occurs is
roughly that one has an earlier experience whose intentionality is such that it contains a
thesis concerning a future experience. In this thesis, the future experience is expected in
something less than any mode of certainty (its occurrence may even be decidedly doubt-
ful or improbable), and the future experience is constituted as valuable in some way.
Achievement-as-fulfillment consists in attaining the aimed-at experience, recognizing that
it is the experience one had aimed-at, recognizing that it has its expected value (and per-
haps a surplus), and recognizing that it was through one’s own efforts that the experience
is now occurring (in the mode of certainty), despite earlier appearing as less than certain.
Where any of these features is lacking, one will not attain the experience of achievement-
as-fulfillment: one’s ambitions might be disappointed if expectations are unfulfilled, or
they might be “fulfilled” but in the manner of a stroke of luck, etc.
What professionalization prescribes and demands is to coordinate these two senses of
achievement, bringing them into alignment. One is encouraged to value the achievement-
objects of the profession, investing them with the same significance that members of the
profession do. If one endorses this valuation, it will bring with it motivations, enabling
one to set goals which aim-at the experience of creating/acquiring those achievement-
objects. When these goals are fulfilled and the achievement-objects are created/acquired,
the experience of achievement-as-fulfillment will then come along as well.
In the ideal situation (in terms of motivation), one already has nascent interest-motives
and (a)-theses that are directed at the work-activities that are required to produce or ac-
quire achievement-objects, and which present the work-activities as pleasurable. And
ideally, one also already has endorsed (b)-theses, evaluating the pursuit of these interest-
motives as “worthwhile.” In that case, one already has one’s own motives for pursuing
the work-activities that are required for creating/acquiring achievement-objects. When
one learns that the profession values the same work-activities (when they lead to cre-
ation/acquisition of achievement-objects), one is poised to endorse (c)-theses, as described
in S4.1 above: one can judge that pursuing the profession’s agenda in creating/acquiring
achievement-objects has pragmatic value as a way of cultivating one’s interests.
As one pursues professionalization there is a characteristic alteration regarding the
14In contemporary philosophy, for example, a co-authored publication is often regarded
as a less valuable achievement-object than a solo-authored publication. Likewise, publica-
tion in “big-name” journals is often counted as more of an achievement than publication
in newer, open-access journals.
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relative weight one places upon (b)-theses (which present the fulfillment of nascent in-
terests as “worthwhile”) and (d)-theses (which present being and becoming a professional
as having special ontological or existential value.) At the outset, as an initiate, one is
necessarily not well-positioned to fully understand the values of the profession, nor what
is involved in being a professional. One begins the process of professionalization plac-
ing more weight on (b)-theses and (c)-theses, pursuing professionalization as a pragmatic
route to cultivating one’s own interests. Over time, the cultivation of those interests brings
with it the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects and experiences of achievement-
as-fulfillment. The more one experiences achievement-as-fulfillment in creating/acquiring
achievement-objects, the more evidence one has for the thesis that one is becoming a sub-
ject who values what a professional values. Every instance of achievement-as-fulfillment
in the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects lends evidence to this thesis. As this
conviction gradually extends in its duration – and especially in light of the work that
is presupposed in sustaining this conviction – one becomes more and more invested, on-
tologically and existentially, in sustaining it. At some point, one is poised to actively
endorse (d)-theses, and to begin to value being-a-professional for its own sake, regardless
of whether the work-activities of the profession fulfill one’s nascent interest-motives.15
There are several ways in which such commitment to (d)-theses can arise indepen-
dently of one’s nascent interest-motives. One possibility is simply that one discovers that
one genuinely does find the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects to be pleasant: new
(a)-like theses are endorsed which constitute new affective validities (beyond the nascent
interest-motives with which one began); new (b)-like theses are endorsed which constitute
the work-activity of the profession as “worthwhile;” one genuinely finds it rewarding to be
professional, so one endorses a (d)-thesis to that effect.
This may be so for some aspects of being-professional, but it is rare for (d)-theses
to be quite to neatly supported. The larger share of commitments to (d)-theses arise
because motivations from other sources fall short. As one continues to subject oneself to
the standards of the profession, pursuing the work-activities that it values and performing
them in the way it sanctions, one will inevitably be required to do things that lie outside
one’s own nascent interest-motives, or to do things one is interested in, but in a way that
one does not find pleasurable or worthwhile. There will be cases there the two senses of
“achievement” are difficult to align, if one is only aiming-at the fulfillment or cultivation
of nascent interest-motives. In such cases, any (b)-theses one had implemented (regarding
the cultivation of one’s interests as “worthwhile”) will fail to provide motivation to proceed
in the way the profession requires: the demands of the profession will eventually fail to
exhibit practical validity as a way of directly cultivating one’s interests (i.e., (c)-theses
will be unavailable).
In some cases, one can shore up motivation by relying on (d)-theses that simply
complement or supplement one’s (b)-theses regarding what is worthwhile. For example,
completing a task T is seen as worthwhile, and while the peculiarities of how a professional
is expected to complete T are not themselves regarded as worthwhile (in that they do not
15It sometimes happens that one is not especially aware of this alteration as it occurs.
One can tell oneself that one is continuing to pursue the work-activities of the profes-
sion because one finds them pleasurable, or because it is pragmatically useful as way of
cultivating interests. Once one’s professional status is called into question, however, and
one faces the possibility that one is not proceeding towards becoming a professional, it
may become clear that one had in fact endorsed (d)-theses, and had put great weight on
being-professional.
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themselves directly cultivate one’s interests), one can simply commit to doing T in this way
because that is what a professional does. A simple academic example might be formatting
a paper to meet a journal’s arbitrary guidelines. This isn’t fun, but might be relatively
painless, so, one does it.
However, if the disparity is greater, and if (b)- and (d)-theses are in outright conflict,
then one confronts a demand of self-alienation and re-invention, which is in fact essential
to the process of professionalization. Two possible aspects of personal character are in
tension: on the one hand, one considers oneself to be a subject who has an interest
in T and finds cultivating this interest worthwhile; on the other hand, the demands of
professionalization are to do T* instead, setting T aside. Here the only motivation for
doing T* comes from (d)-theses: one must resolve oneself to do T* because that is what
one does if one is professional. An academic example might be altering the content of a
paper significantly in response to reviewer feedback, moving the topics under discussion
far away from the topics that lay closest to one’s own interests.
The more frequently one goes along with this kind of alteration and standardization of
work-activity – the more one permits oneself to be alienated from one’s own nascent inter-
ests and their cultivation – the more evidence one gains for the (d)-thesis that one values
being-professional for its own sake, in distinction to any value one places on cultivating
one’s own interests for their own sake. Self-alienation, in the form of “setting-aside” (a)-
and (b)-theses, opens the door to self-creation, in the form of endorsing (d)-theses and
regarding oneself as someone who values being-professional. Endorsing these (d)-theses
enables one to alter one’s motives and goals, bringing achievement-as-fulfillment back into
alignment with the profession’s conception of achievement. It is very likely that one will
be able to maintain commitment to some (b)-theses and some (a)-theses as one proceeds
through professionalization. But such re-invention and re-alignment will inevitably be-
come a motivational necessity at some point if one wishes to continue along the path of
professionalization.
When this alignment is in place, one experiences achievement-as-fulfillment in the
creation/acquisition of achievement-objects. In terms of motivation, one is now set to
pursue the path to professionalization. But this alignment is not sufficient on its own
to enable one to attain evidence that one is making progress. The evidential or doxic
significance of achievement is bound up with social validities, in two principal ways.
On the one hand, when one succeeds in the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects
that the profession values, this must simultaneously be taken to provide evidence regard-
ing one’s own “professional” skills, and thereby provides evidence that can support (e)-
theses (which present oneself as a peer who belongs alongside members of the profession),
(f )-theses (which present oneself as on-the-way to belonging alongside members), and
(g)-theses (which present oneself as further-along than other initiates). In this way, the
creation/acquisition of achievement-objects licenses theses that constitute new social va-
lidities: they allow one to re-position oneself in relation to Others along the path toward
membership.
On the other hand, since what is central here is the socio-cultural (geistig) value of the
achievements, social validities are presupposed in the implementation of theses regarding
any achievement-object’s value. It is the profession, as a social organism, that determines
the value of achievements. To attain the alignment between the senses of achievement,
one’s own assessment of the value of one’s achievement-objects must track the assessments
of members. In some social contexts, systems of achievements are communally constituted
to proceed in relatively clear, linear gradations (e.g., colored “belts” in some martial arts;
awarding honorary titles or degrees; seeds and rankings, etc.). These make assessments of
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the significance of achievements relatively clear, and make comparisons to Others relatively
straightforward, supporting clear (e)-, (f )-, and (g)-theses. Other systems of achievements
are a bit less linear: e.g., “publications” and “presentations” are clear achievements in
many academic professions, but it is often difficult to determine the comparative value
of different varieties of each. It is often the case that even after the creation/acquisition
of an achievement-object, one is not entirely certain of its value. Here interactions with
Others may be required to make some determination of how well one is making progress.
Evidentially (and according to the profession) the most effective strategy is to rely on
(f )-theses, locating an “expert” that one takes to be further-along in professionalization,
soliciting their appraisal of the achievement-object.16 The whole agenda of valuing and
pursuing communally-approved achievement-objects demands commitment to the social
validities that constitute the social world of the profession.
In sum, achievement-objects serve as an intentional nexus in experiences of profes-
sionalization. Finding value in the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects is the mo-
tivational focal point that can drive one along the path of professionalization, through
self-alienation and re-creation. Their creation/acquisition is also the evidential focal point
for unifying all the theses concerning “progress” in professionalization: the repeated cre-
ation/acquisition of achievement-objects provides the required evidence to re-affirm all
these theses. Repeated re-affirmations form an interlocking web of theses, consolidating
evidence in their favor, and further reinforcing motivation.
All these re-affirmations are to be understood, phenomenologically, as acts of the
pure ego which result in the “sedimentation” of purported personal traits, as described
in S3.3 above. These sedimentations are the appearances of a personal ego – they consti-
tute the phenomena as-of a human being who is working through and committed to the
process of professionalization, and who is becoming a professional. Repetition of these
re-affirmations supports an integration and solidification of one’s identity as someone who
is becoming a professional. In the Natural Attitude, we endorse the thesis that this is
who we are. This is how one comes to see oneself as someone who is committed to the
“plan” of professionalization, and who is on-the-way-to-being, or becoming, a member of
the profession.
4.3 Modalities
These different theses occur in different modalities and arise in different ways.
(a)-theses concerning the affective validity of one’s interests occur (if at all) in some-
thing akin to the na¨ıve mode of certainty that is characteristic of perception. Most im-
portantly, these theses arise without the pure ego’s involvement. Why do you think that
thing is green? I can see it is. Why do you find the fulfillment of your interests pleasant?
I simply feel that I do. The pure ego need not be involved in constituting these interests,
nor the affective theses about them: they simply arise in transcendental subjectivity.
Still, the pure ego can make an evaluative judgment about these interests. The ego
can make a decision about whether they are to be valued beyond their native pleasantness,
16Strategies of peer-review are intended to frontload this appraisal, weeding out un-
satisfactory work and preventing it from leading to the creation/acquisition of a public
achievement-object. There is, of course, much room for modalization: if the “experts” do
not value one’s work, perhaps it is their expertise, and not the quality of the work, that
will be called into question.
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and so cultivated. These judgments contain a new (b)-thesis, which presents the fulfill-
ment of one’s interests as “rewarding” or “worthwhile.” These theses are implemented
by active decision-making, as described in S3.5. Actively-implemented theses are always
– at their strongest – in the mode of “impure” certainty. Implementing these theses re-
quires “striking-down” or “setting-aside” validities, at least in the sense of setting aside
or de-valuing other interests, so as to prioritize the cultivation of these. Precisely because
the certainty is impure and there are standing validities that can call it into question,
the implementation of (b)-theses is tenuous, and is always a potential target of future
modalization.
A similar mode characterizes: (c)-theses concerning the pragmatic value of pursuing
professionalization; (d)-theses concerning the existential value of being a member; and (e)-,
(f )-, and (g)-theses concerning one’s professional-social standing. Becoming a member in
the profession is not the only way to pursue nascent interests, it is simply one way in
which might try to do so. Someone who chooses this particular path has made an active
decision to do so. This requires “striking-down” or “setting-aside” validities,” at least in
the sense of setting aside or de-valuing: (i) other seemingly-valid paths one could take,
(ii) other modes of being, and (iii) other ways of relating to Others. All this “setting-
aside” is required to implement theses that assign heightened importance to the strategy of
professionalization, to the validities that it constitutes, and to the validities it presupposes.
While one is in-process and pursuing professionalization, the strongest modality that these
theses could attain is a kind of “impure certainty” that remains open to the possibility of
active doubt.
When one finds oneself succeeding in the plan of pursuing professionalization, what
one finds is an increasing number of achievements. One takes these to license the ever-
stronger implementation of all these theses regarding one’s professionalization, in some-
thing approaching the mode of impure certainty. Anyone who has gone through profes-
sionalization will tell you that even impure certainty is typically not reached. Typically,
the theses regarding one’s status as on-the-way to becoming professional are implemented
in a mode less than certainty: at most (if one is honest with oneself, and on a good day)
the available evidence can allow these theses to be implemented in a mode of high prob-
ability. The ontological validity of oneself as becoming-professional, for example, is less
than certain: one is probably-on-the-way-to-becoming-professional.
Moreover, the theses typically waver in shifting modalizations, from high probability
to low probability or even (on a bad day) outright doubt. This is especially so if the
relative socio-cultural (geistig) value of different achievement-objects is indeterminate in
a given profession, and allows only very tenuous assessments of how well one is faring.
Understanding the impact and evolution of such modalizations is the key to a phe-
nomenology of professional failure.
5 A Phenomenology of Failure
I’ve provided a brief phenomenology of professionalization. What this amounts to is a
phenomenological analysis of conditions 1-3 that I initially offered (pages 2-3 above) to
delineate the experiences of professional failure that I would seek to analyze. I’ve ana-
lyzed the experiential context and background against which an experience of professional
failure occurs. Now it’s time for the main event. I’ll first (S5.1) examine the core in-
tentional structure of a single experience of professional failure. I’ll then (S5.2) examine
how repeated professional failure plays out over the long-term, and how the experience of
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abjection arises, over and over again (S5.3). Finally, (S5.4) I’ll examine how one might
escape the dynamics of failure.
5.1 Perturbation
Condition #4 on an experience of professional failure is that one makes some attempt
to proceed along the path of professionalization, and one sees oneself as failing in the
attempt.
Phenomenologically, what occurs here is that one fails to attain an experience of
achievement-as-fulfillment (S4.2, page 13 above). A future experience had been expected
in something less than any mode of certainty: the natural and effortless occurrence of
this future experience was constituted, in expectation, as improbable. Yet, this future
experience had been constituted as valuable in some way. Because it was valuable, one
was motivated to pursue it, and one took steps to do so. The key to a failure by one’s own
lights is that one has not attained this aimed-at experience, despite one’s best efforts. One
took steps – sanctioned, one thought, by the profession – to bring about this aimed-at
experience, doing all one could to make its occurrence as probable as one could. Yet one
has not fulfilled one’s prior goals, and thus one sees oneself as failing, by one’s own lights,
to overcome this challenge.
Condition #5 is that the failure is not only seen as an isolated failure, but is also
seen as preventing further progress along the path.
Phenomenologically, three things are central here. First: one understood the aimed-
at experience as an experience of the creation/acquisition of an achievement-object, and
one anticipated that its creation/acquisition would bring with it evidence of one’s own
professional status. Now how does this evidential relation arise? The successful cre-
ation/acquisition of an achievement-object is seen, by the profession, as requiring certain
skills and traits. In the socio-cultural (geistig) constitution of achievement-objects, there is
built into these objects an etiological dependency. Part of what it is to be an achievement-
object is to be an object which, it is held, cannot be brought into existence except through
the exercise of certain skills and traits – the very skills and traits which are valued in the
work-activities of the profession. If one understands the socio-cultural value placed upon
achievement-objects, then one can form the expectation that should one succeed in creat-
ing/acquiring it, one will have secured evidence of one’s own skills and traits.
Second: the two senses of achievement had previously been brought into alignment:
one had been striving for achievement-as-fulfillment in the creation/acquisition of this
achievement-object. Thus arises the afore-mentioned lack of an experience of achievement-
as-fulfillment, whereby condition #4 is fulfilled.
Third: one had seen the creation/acquisition of this achievement-object as the “next
step” along the path of professionalization, which would enable future steps. In other
words: the skills and traits whose possession and apt exercise are constituted as necessary
for the creation/acquisition of the achievement-object are also the very skills and traits
that are seen as required to continue progressing along the path of professionalization.
Because one fails to create/acquire the achievement-object, one fails to gain evidence that
one possesses these skills and traits. As a result, one does not see how it could be possible
to proceed further along the path.
This kind of experience can arise at essentially any moment, but in many professions
there are certain relatively standardized achievement-objects whose creation/acquisition is
used to “test” initiates’ skill-levels. As a clear academic example: during graduate studies
one can be quite literally expelled from the pre-profession, booted off the path, if one
(a)-theses:
fulfilling interest-motives
is pleasurable.
(b)-theses:
fulfilling interest-motives
is “worthwhile.”
(c)-theses:
professionalization has
utility as a means of
cultivating interests.
(d)-theses:
being-professional has
ontological/existential
value.
(e)-theses:
I belong alongside Others;
Others are peers.
(f )-theses:
I am on-the-way to
belonging alongside
Others; Others are
where I can be.
(g)-theses:
I am further-along
than Others; Others
are somewhere that
I have surpassed.
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fails to demonstrate required skills and traits through completing qualifying exams, or the
defense of a prospectus.
Condition #6 is that since previous steps in the plan were supposedly preparation
for this attempt, the failure calls into question whether and how well one has succeeded
in previous steps.
As already noted, achievement-objects are constituted in experience as etiologically
dependent upon the possession and exercise of “professional” skills and traits. When
one makes one’s best effort to create/acquire an achievement-object, one must make a
multitude of judgments, implementing a number of theses. Two broad categories of the-
ses are important here. First, there are theses which constitute oneself as possessing
previously-acquired skills and traits. These theses are motivated by previous achievement-
as-fulfillment along the path to professionalization. Second, there are practical theses re-
garding how to put these skills and traits to work in an attempt to create/acquire the
aimed-at achievement-object. If one fails in the attempt, one of these two kinds of judg-
ments must be modalized. One can retrospectively call into question the thesis that one
truly does possess the skills and traits in question – if one had them, shouldn’t one have
been successful in the attempt? Alternatively, one can call into question one’s plans –
perhaps one has all the required skills and traits, but has not put them to work properly?
Either modalization suffices to meet condition #6. For the ability to create plans to
deploy one’s other skills and traits in the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects is
itself one of the skills that is characteristic of a professional. A professional not only has,
shall we say, “first-order” capabilities to perform the work-activities of the profession, but
has “second-order” capabilities to self-determine how to pursue that work successfully.
And so, whether one has erred in exercising this second-order skill by coming up with a
bad work-plan, or whether one lacks the first-order skills required to execute an apt plan,
it comes to the same thing: one’s self-apprehension is modalized, and one is re-constituted
as someone who was not prepared for success. Of necessity, some prior step in the plan
of professionalization must have been a mis-step. The past experiences that seemed to
provide evidence for theses concerning one’s skills and traits must now be modalized: these
past experiences can be recalled just fine, but the theses they were taken to support now
stand in some mode of doubt.
Condition #7 is that since success in the plan consists of attaining an identity as a
member, the failure calls into question whether one can attain that identity.
The basic prerequisites for meeting this condition are already present in any experience
of failure fulfilling conditions #5 & #6. All that is required is (i) that the very skills
that were called into question by the failure are seen as partly constitutive of professional
identity, and (ii) that the path of professionalization is seen as the cultivation of an identity,
in keeping with (d)-theses. Since one has failed in the attempt, one has not demonstrated
possession of these skills and traits, despite one’s best efforts. Since possession of these
skills and traits is seen as constitutive of professional identity, one’s failure to demonstrate
them is evidence that one is failing to cultivate that identity.
Condition #8 is that since failure in the attempt interrupts progress in the plan,
it calls into question one’s current identity as someone-who-is-on-the-way-to-being, or
becoming, a member, and thus calls into question relationships with Others.
What is at issue here is the modalization of (e)-, (f )-, and (g)-theses. Failure in the
attempt calls into question whether one possesses certain skills and traits. Previously,
one had relied on theses concerning the possession of just these skills and traits (derived
from experiences of the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects) to support theses
concerning one’s social standing in the profession. In the face of failure, one must now
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reconsider this: perhaps one is not quite so far-along as one thought; perhaps one has not
surpassed certain Others as one had thought; perhaps one is further-behind Others than
one thought.
This is the basic flavor of a phenomenology of professional failure. Any isolated pro-
fessional failure leads to a perturbation – a suite of ramifying modalizations – of the theses
concerning one’s progress in professionalization. In an isolated case, it remains possible
that the failure can be overcome. One might receive feedback from a mentor to develop
a new plan; one might pursue some remedial work-activities to shore up required skills.
With another attempt, it is possible that failure might be overcome, and all these theses
could be re-modalized and restored to their original strength (approaching some variety
of impure certainty), putting one back on the path of professionalization. But these same
modalizations have profound implications when failure is repetitive.
5.2 Repetition & Disintegration
A single failure can produce a perturbation of the web of theses that constitute one’s
experience of professionalization. With repeated failure, there is more and more evidence
against these theses. It becomes more and more difficult to restore any of the theses in this
web to anything approaching a mode of certainty. Fundamentally, achievement-objects are
no longer able to function as an intentional nexus in the experience of professionalization
(p.16 above). I’ll highlight four important dimensions of this breakdown of validities.
Concerning past achievements: When success in professionalization is proceed-
ing apace, one finds more and more experiences of achievement-as-fulfillment in the cre-
ation/acquisition of achievement-objects, which provide greater and greater evidence of
one’s success in professionalization (cf. S4.2 above). A teleological directedness or mo-
mentum is experienced as running through all these past experiences of achievement, and
pointing towards new possibilities. Every completed achievement brings with it a horizon
of new challenges to be overcome in greater achievements. Every new attempt stands on
the pre-given foundation of the skills and traits acquired and honed in past achievements,
cultivating them further. Each achievement is experienced not only as its own achieve-
ment with its own value, but each of them is also bound up with the others in an intricate
system of solidified values marching towards “better-yet.” Husserl often talks of knowl-
edge, of familiarity, and of practical mastery in terms of the “I can do it again” character
of past experiences. The teleological directedness I am emphasizing here is an intricate set
of relationships backwards and forwards between experiences in subjective time that has
several characters: “I could not have done this, had I not done that” and “I can (probably)
do this, because I have already done that” and “I could do that better-still-again, now
that I have done this,” etc.
These “I-Can...’ characters are precisely the ways of thinking about one’s achievements
that the profession licenses and mandates in the socio-cultural (geistig) value that it
assigns to the creation/acquisition of achievement-objects. The creation/acquisition of
an achievement-object has it’s own “native” value, whatever it might be in each case:
they were, after all, won through some effort, and their public display and circulation
may have some value independent of the profession. The profession, in assigning special
significance to these achievement-objects, assigns another value to them: they are evidence
of “professional” skills and traits, which are always understood as to-be-cultivated within
the purview of the profession’s training apparatus. The cultivation of these skills and
traits on the march through professionalization is precisely the cultivation of “I-Can...”
characters of experience, as one proceeds towards mastery of the skills and traits that are
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valued in the work-activities of the profession.
These “I-Can...” characters depend upon understanding the shared value that past
achievements have as a totality: a propulsive motivating force that is constituted in the
teleological directedness that runs through them and points beyond them to ever-new
challenges.
With repeated failure, this teleological directedness breaks down. Past achievements
can no longer be taken as indications of one’s ability to succeed anew: if they were valid
indications, then one would cease failing. The “I-Can...” characters of one’s experiences
must be modalized: somehow one is not prepared to do this thing one is attempting to do.
With every failed attempt, the “I-Can...” characters slide further and further away from
any impure certainty, becoming decidedly doubtful. In an effort to correct this, one makes
ever-new attempts, trying more and more strategies to attain success, reaching further
and further back to find some solid core of past success that one can depend on in the
new attempt. As failure occurs yet again, one becomes more and more bewildered about
where the mis-step occurred that has led to one’s inability to succeed. At the extreme,
the entire teleological directedness running through past achievements breaks down. The
only remaining value of past achievements is the “native” value they have on their own,
which is dispersed among them. They are no longer experienced as bearing any evident
teleological relations between them.
Concerning future possibilities: As this momentum dissolves through repeated
failure, the “I-Can...” characters of future anticipations likewise dissolve. No next step on
the path of professionalization seems readily possible: I cannot bring it about, despite my
best, repeated efforts. The future one had anticipated slides away as one becomes more
and more certain that it is completely uncertain. At the extreme, when the momentum
of past achievements has broken down completely, pursuing the work-activities of the
profession offers no expectations of future success. There is no longer any future in it.
Concerning social situation: In line with (e)-, (f )-, (g)-theses, one had seen oneself
as a member of a group of peers (fellow-initiates), working towards full membership in the
profession alongside existing members. One had a plan for how to achieve success, but
that plan has failed, as repeated failed attempts have called the whole plan into question
in the breakdown of the teleological directedness of past achievements.
All (e)-, (f )-, (g)-theses now stand modalized. One no longer knows with any degree
of certainty where one stands in relation to Others. Ultimately, one no longer has any un-
derstanding of the socio-cultural (geistig) value that the profession assigns to achievement-
objects. One had created/acquired some of these objects; one thought this was an indicator
of one’s skills and traits; one expected that this could lead to future success. All this has
been put into doubt.
One no longer knows what it was one did that led to something that Others had
deemed a relevant “achievement,” a partial success, in past cases.
One no longer knows how to evaluate the achievements of Others: do theirs con-
tain some hidden feature that makes them incomparable to one’s own? Were one’s own
achievements sham copies?
One no longer knows who is to be regarded as an “expert” in the profession. Hadn’t
experts vouched for the quality of one’s own past achievements, vindicating them as in-
dicating the possession of “professional” skills and traits? Hadn’t they encouraged the
cultivation of “I-Can...” characters of experience, driving one forward into new chal-
lenges? And then again: aren’t experts (perhaps the same ones, perhaps others) now
issuing an opposite judgment, as one’s repeated attempts are met with failure? Which
of the alleged “experts” should be taken as having the professional mastery to issue the
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correct judgment about the true value of one’s achievements? And the more worrisome
possibility: do any of them really know what they’re talking about?
Concerning self: Any in-progress professional identity one had been cultivating in
sedimentations cannot be sustained in the face of these breakdowns. The teleological
unity of past achievements in subjective time has been dissolved; any seemingly stable
personal character traits that were built upon those past achievements have dissolved. The
phenomena of oneself as a professional human subject have disintegrated. One no longer
really knows who one is. One had been cultivating a professional identity in-line with
some (d)-thesis, which constituted that mode of being (being-professional) as valuable.
One had in fact “struck-down” or “set-aside” other existential and ontological validities
to prioritize this one. All of this is now withheld, as repeated failure calls into question
the possibility of attaining this mode of being. One’s own being is modalized. One sees
oneself as not-really-after-all-knowing-who-one-is, having-no-clear-path.
This is where experiences of professional failure can be especially disconcerting. One
might hope to find some solace, preserving some core of personal character, by reflecting
on how one’s achievements have fulfilled (a)-theses and (b)-theses. Not even professional
failure could nullify the affective and evaluative validities these theses constitute. But if
one has proceeded very far along the path of professionalization, one has likely already been
alienated from many of the nascent interest-motives that led one into professionalization.
One “set-aside” those motives in favor of others long ago, when one endorsed a (d)-thesis.
And so in retrospect, it was precisely this self-alienation that led one to one’s current,
somewhat tragic position, in which one has tried to value being-professional for it’s own
sake, but is failing to do what is required to be-professional. The result is a novel variety
of self-alienation which does not bring with it any straightforward opportunity for self-
creation. (But see S5.4 below).
5.3 Act-schism & the Impossibility of Encouragement
I’ve described an extreme in the previous section: the total breakdown of the web of
theses that support any attempt at professionalization. But an important element in an
experience of professional failure is its dynamics: it is not a constant, total breakdown,
but rather a vibrating alternation between extremes. I call experiences at the extremity
of total breakdown abjection. I call experiences at the other extremity resolution.
When one stands in abjection (or, when repeated professional failure takes on the
character of abject failure), none of one’s past experiences of achievement retains any
motivation towards new attempts at achievement, and all theses concerning professional
values, professional standing, and professional self are modalized to occur in a mode of
doubt.
When one enacts resolution, one re-commits to the plan of professionalization: one
resolves to try yet again. For genuine resolution to occur, one must genuinely work one-
self back into the belief that “I-Can...” somehow succeed. One makes an honest effort,
genuinely devising a plan that, one thinks, could lead to success despite challenges.
Phenomenologically, the most profound aspect of repeated experiences of professional
failure is not abjection. Rather it is the alternation between abjection and resolution, in
a prolonged and multifaceted act-schism (S3.5 above) involving many conflicting theses.
As the phenomena of one’s human, professional self have begun to disintegrate, the pure
ego must try going along with theses on both sides. I try considering the evidence that
could lead me to judge that perhaps success is forthcoming: I reconsider past experiences,
revisit old achievement-objects, poring over them for some sliver of evidence that could
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tip the scales decisively in favor of resolution. I may even succeed in enacting resolution:
thereupon follows a fresh attempt – and another failure. But then I consider the evidence
that would lead me to judge that success is not forthcoming: I reconsider the ever-growing
list of failures, the seeming insurmountability of the challenge despite my best efforts. The
pure ego is placed at variance with itself. It cannot decide the evidence one way or the
other. And as a result, the pure ego cannot constitute stable convictions that one could
take as appearances of oneself as-of a stable human subject.
This vibration between extremes occurs in the innermost depths of transcendental
subjectivity. It is completely incomprehensible to any Other subject who is going on
about their business in the Natural Attitude, and who apprehends all Others as human
subjects in the social world. These Others cannot help but mis-understand the vibration as
some crisis of human motivation. They recommend remedies for human problems. More
cautious plans. More forgiving agendas. More careful attention. More sleep. A vacation.
A distraction. “Where did you last see it?” Chicken soup.
This kind of solicitation is well-meant, and in many cases, it is tolerable or even
pleasant. But when one has been spiraling in the vibration for some time, and when this
kind of solicitation comes from those involved in the profession, it takes on a perverse
aspect. Those involved in the profession, who are operating in the Natural Attitude, are
the closest to who one wants to be, yet the furthest from understanding where one is.
Well-meaning professionals and pre-professionals seek to provide encouragement, but do
not understand that this is what is precisely impossible. They draw attention to past
achievements – not understanding that their significance and teleological connectedness
has been modalized already. They draw attention to future possibilities of success – not
understanding that these are precisely what one cannot readily countenance after the
disintegration. Or they seek to solicit “casual” professional conversation as if nothing is
amiss – not understanding that this enforces the vibration, pushing one right back into
the act-schism through a kind of gaslighting that discounts the profound modalizations
that are motivated by one’s own experiences of failure. Or, more perversely still: their
encouragements suggest that all this should have been anticipated – as if any aspect of
the profession’s cult of “I-Can...” had prepared one for the abjection of “I quite clearly
cannot, despite my best efforts and despite your best wishes.” Or, most perverse of all,
they suggest that all this is somehow appropriate, that everything is going to plan – as
if repeated failure itself should be assigned some secret socio-cultural value within the
profession; as if the profession itself intended to sustain a pool of supplicants who are
made to dwell in the vibration.
When one dwells in the vibration, one is not truly living alongside anyone in the pro-
fession for any duration. The entire social and practical world of the profession flickers and
vibrates, it approaches and recedes. Others are at one moment near/admirable/friendly,
and in the next moment remote/perverse/hostile, over and over again. The work-activities
of the profession are at one moment attractive/rewarding, and in the next moment
repellent/soul-crushing, over and over again.
5.4 Inversion & Reconstitution
There are six possibilities for how one might escape the vibration of prolonged act-schism
– whether temporarily or more permanently. The starting point for realizing any of these
possibilities is to “strike-down” or “set-aside” some validity. The six possibilities are:
(1) striking-down abjection and enacting resolution, (2) attaining evidence of success, (3)
attaining incontrovertible evidence of failure, (4) striking-down resolution and enacting
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abjection, (5) reversion to nascent interest-motives, and (6) inverting all valuations of
professionalization. I discuss each in turn.
One might actively decide to strike down the validity of abjection, enact resolution,
and try yet again. In the moment when one enacts resolution, one has temporarily escaped
the act-schism: this is the first possibility.
I suspect many will find this option admirable, though it does not require any more
strength of will than does going along with abjection. And notably: the long-term outcome
of enacting resolution remains unsettled. Resolution simply does not guarantee success.
Resolution is a gamble. One hopes that this time one will get lucky, that this time the
world will cooperate, that this time one will not be recycled and deposited once more at
the doorstop of failure. This is possible: one might gain evidence that one has indeed
succeeded. Resolution that leads to success is the second possibility for how to escape
act-schism. If one attains evidence of success, then one will again be in a position to
re-implement the theses regarding progress in professionalization in something closer to
the mode of impure certainty. Doubts (i.e., the theses of abjection) will be assuaged,
the appearances as-of oneself as a “professional” human subject will re-stabilize, and one
will no longer be drawn into act-schism. This is a slightly longer-term escape from act-
schism – the theses of resolution and success can remain in place unless and until they are
challenged by new evidence of failure.
Yet the fresh attempts that resolution supports create just this possibility of future
failure. And resolution that leads to failure brings with it a return to the vibration. All
too often, resolution is repeatedly pursued not because of any strength of will, but simply
because old habits die hard, and because one is a burnt-out husk that has been emptied of
any existential-ontological values – valuations of who one wants to be – that could supplant
the (d)-thesis that being-professional is valuable, and the attendant theses that motivate
one to try once again.
Repeated attempts at resolution, leading repeatedly to additional failures, can bring
about the third possibility for escaping act-schism: if one can attain incontrovertible
evidence of failure, then the weight of evidence in favor of abjection will decisively outweigh
the evidence in favor of resolution. Passive doubt will have been resolved, and there will
no longer be any opportunity for the active doubt of act-schism. One will no longer be in
a position where one needs to “strike down” any validities, since the validities in favor of
resolution will have already been undermined. The entire suite of “I-Can...” characters
of experience will have been replaced with “I-Cannot...” characters. While this is an
ideal possibility, this third option for escaping act-schism is often difficult to realize. One
difficulty is that many professions assign only indeterminate value to achievement-objects,
making it difficult for one to ever become certain that one’s failure is truly insurmountable:
past achievements might always be desperately reinterpreted as evidence of possible, future
success. Another difficulty is that in the face of failure, professionals and pre-professionals
are likely to offer “encouragement,” soliciting fresh attempts and enforcing the vibration
of act-schism.
The other escape-route is to actively decide to strike down the validities of resolution,
embrace abjection, and cease one’s attempts at professional success.17 In the moment when
one strikes down the validities of resolution, one has temporarily escaped act-schism: this
is the fourth possibility. There are two distinct possibilities for more long-term resolutions
along this path.
17As noted in the Introduction, I don’t consider this “quitting” the profession – one
never was a member; one cannot “quit” in the sense of resigning.
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One possibility along this path (and the fifth escape-route) is reversion: go back to
where one was before pursuing professionalization. Reach back behind the self-alienation
that the profession demanded, and re-ignite one’s nascent interest-motives, reconstituting
oneself as a person who values those interests for their own sake, independent of the
profession.
Reversion has its comforts, and if it can be attained, one will have disentangled oneself
from the profession. One will have re-constituted oneself as a human subject with relatively
stable convictions in the “worthwhileness” of pursuing these interest-motives. This is
an ideal possibility, but is often difficult to attain. Reversion must truly overcome self-
alienation. One’s nascent interest-motives have been reformed and re-directed by the
profession: what had been “pleasant” and “worthwhile” has already been refashioned
into “work,” and one has invested great effort in learning how a professional goes about
pursuing these interests in a constrained, “responsible” manner. To sustain reversion, all
the professional alignments between achievement-objects and achievement-as-fulfillment
must be disengaged. One must systematically deconstruct the web of theses that had
grown up around achievement-objects, disentangling one’s (non-professional) interests.
Here reversion confronts another difficulty: on its own, reversion fails to fully confront
the validity of abjection and of failure. It fails to recognize that an interest in cultivating
these same nascent interest-motives, plus a certain na¨ıvete, are what led one down the
path of professionalization and into a profound disappointment. If one is to disentangle
interest-motives from the profession and avoid being drawn back into it, one must not
only deconstruct the web of theses surrounding achievement-objects, but must be actively
on guard against na¨ıvely slipping back into the valuations of the profession.
The more radical option along this path is inversion. This is the sixth possibility
for escaping act-schism.18 In inversion, one embraces the thesis of the complete failure of
professionalization, recognizing that it was one’s nascent interest-motives, plus a certain
na¨ıvete, that led into this failure. After the disintegration of the teleological directedness
of past achievements, these achievements were left only with their “native” values, viewed
as dispersed overcomings-of-challenges with no connection between them. In inversion,
one pursues a new totalizing valuation: every past achievement along the path of profes-
sionalization is valued as a mis-step, and the totality is seen as a mistake. After this same
disintegration, one stood modalized, and one’s own being was left doubtful and uncer-
tain. In inversion, one endorses a new determinate thesis: one constitutes their human
subjectivity as being-a-failure, as having-been-in-error, as being-a-fool. Any remaining “I-
Can...” characters of experience are set aside, and instead one actively implements theses
to declare: I will no longer. In the inversion, the profession is completely de-valued, as is
being-professional. The entire web of theses is decisively inverted. The work-activities of
the profession are decisively evaluated as having no practical validity as way of cultivating
one’s interests. Being-professional is decisively evaluated as not a valuable way to be.
If one can sustain inversion, then one has not only escaped the vibration of act-schism,
but has cut off any route that could draw one back into it. The are several significant
barriers to pursuing inversion.
First: from within. This is the nature of act-schism. In inversion one declares, in effect:
“if those are the rules of the game, then I do not wish to play anymore.” It is difficult
to endorse this thesis, because there remains evidence to support the thesis that one does
want to play the game, and some evidence that one is good at the game. Juxtaposed
18One can combine reversion and inversion: inversion can help support reversion. But
inversion can also be pursued on its own.
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against this is the conflicting evidence that one really does not understand the game, that
one is not in fact good at it, and that no one seems to want you on their team.
Second: from without. The professionals and pre-professionals alongside whom one
had been working expect certain behaviors – “professionalism.” They expect human dis-
appointment in the face of failure, and they also expect the quiet re-assertion of continuing
resolution: after all, they’ve all overcome past challenges, and they’ve seen you do the same.
This means that if one simply disengages from the work-activities and social activities of
the profession, one has not really made one’s position clear: this could be interpreted as
taking a simple “break” to muster strength for the next attempt.19 Mere disengagement
is likely to solicit attempts at encouragement – which as discussed above, only re-enforce
social validities that put one back into the vibration of act-schism. The threat of encour-
agement is precisely what must be evaded to attain stable inversion and escape act-schism.
One must not only strike down the validity of the web of theses internally, but must also
strike down standing social validities: one must actively and thoroughly alienate oneself
from the profession, systematically disrupting Others’ apprehension of you, as a means of
preventing them from pulling you back into the profession.
Only a thorough and public declaration of one’s break from the profession could really
demonstrate that one has opted to pursue the radical option of inversion. It is impossible to
do this in a “professional” manner, by definition. And there is the risk of misunderstanding:
“I am done with this” may not fully convey the recognition of profound failure that is built
into inversion. Perhaps better: “This profession is done with me.”
One has to confront the near-certainty that if one succeeds in making the break, the
profession’s devotees will look upon you with some degree of pity and revulsion: they
have already de-valued other modes of being besides being-professional, including what-
ever mode of being one might turn to cultivate. Many modes of being besides being-
professional have already been evaluated as less-valuable than being-professional. This
evaluation cross-cuts the “within-without” divide, and is perhaps the most significant
barrier to inversion: one must resist inhabiting the professional perspective from which
this evaluation is apt. The key to sustaining conviction in inversion is to externalize this
valuation, rather than endorsing it as a self-evaluation. Inversion is a novel form of self-
alienation: alienation from the professional self one had been trying to constitute, and
rejection of all the validities that being-professional presupposes and enacts. When pro-
fessionals and pre-professionals assert (and when you consider endorsing this assertion for
yourself) that “it is truly a shame that you have abandoned the profession,” you must ask
yourself – and perhaps ask them, too – “yes; but should I be ashamed?”
It is only from within the perspective of the profession that being-a-failure is treated
as shameful. For any subject living within the boundaries imposed by the valuations of the
profession, being-a-failure is a boundary-condition and a lowly end-state. If one de-values
the profession through inversion, one likewise de-values its judgment on this matter. In
inversion, being-a-failure is understood as a starting-point for pursuing some new mode of
being. By striking-down the validities of the profession, one escapes act-schism, and is now
free to assign heightened values to other interests, other modes of being, that lie outside
the profession’s purview. Identifying and cultivating these new values is a challenge of self-
creation – but by constituting oneself as a professional failure, one is poised to overcome
it on one’s own terms, and has at least a chance of avoiding in the future the problematic
forms self-alienation that one had na¨ıvely tolerated.
19The seasonality of many professional job-markets does not help here, as everyone
expects a long hiatus between attempts.
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6 Conclusion
I’m done with this.
